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Abstract
We deal with the analysis of a general equilibrium model with restricted participation
in financial markets and with numeraire assets. We consider an exchange economy
and assume that there are two periods of time and S possible states of nature in the
second period. Markets may in principle be complete, but each household has her
own specific restricted way to access to it. In particular, we assume that households
are allowed to choose portfolios in a closed and convex set containing zero. Our
main goal in this work is to provide a proof of existence of equilibria under rela-
tively general assumptions, by assuming that the households may have non-complete
or non-transitive preferences, and by using a variational inequality approach. More
precisely, we introduce a sequence of generalized quasi-variational inequalities and
we show that an associated sequence of solutions converges to an equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The object of this paper is the analysis of the existence problem in a general equilib-
rium economic model with restricted participation on financial markets. The desired
goal is accomplished by using a variational inequality approach.
The model describes an exchange economy where time and uncertainty are explic-
itly taken into account. Agents live for two periods and in the second period a finite
number of uncertain scenarios, or states of the world, can occur. We assume that they
can have non-complete or non-transitive preferences. It is assumed that agents cannot
directly exchange goods in different states, but they can use financial assets to indi-
rectly accomplish that task. A financial asset is a binding contract which in exchange
of a payment in the first period gives the right to receive back some resources in each
state the second period. It is well known that if the number of available, sufficiently
diversified assets is large enough, then an equilibrium exists and it coincides with the
standard equilibrium in an exchange economy - see Arrow (1953). If that is not the
case, it can been shown that equilibria still exist - see Cass (2006), Werner (1985) and
Geneakoplos and Polemarchakis see (1986) - but with dramatically different proper-
ties - see Villanacci and others (Villanacci et al. 2002) for a formalization and a proof
of the above sentence. Observe that in the above framework, agents or households
are assumed to be free to buy any vector of assets, so-called portfolios, in the whole
Euclidean space of dimension equal to the number of available assets.
The above model of so-called incomplete financial markets has been criticized
under the simple observation that recent years have witnessed the very fast growth
of the number of qualitatively different available financial assets. It seems hard to
believe that the assumption about the availability of too few assets does hold true in
current financially very sophisticated economies.
On the other hand, “while there might be some disagreement over whether, in
a modern developed economy, financial markets are actually incomplete, there can
hardly be any disagreement over whether at least some economic agents are vari-
ously constrained in transacting on those financial markets.”1 It is then important
to generalize the incomplete market model adding the restriction that each agent or
household can choose her portfolio holdings in a personalized subset of the appropri-
ate Euclidean space of dimension equal to the number of available assets. This subset
represents the household specific portfolio set, i.e., the set of possible credit trans-
actions available to the corresponding household. The above model of “restricted
participation constitutes a bona fide generalization of the model with incomplete
markets, but the latter potentially embodies far more interesting institutional fea-
tures (and not just the flavor of restricted participation) since it permits, for instance,
modeling short sales bounds or market margin requirements.”2
1See Cass (1992), p. 274.
2See Cass (1992), p. 275.
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Several contribution on the topic are available in the literature. The first contribu-
tion was provided in the research group leaded by David Cass at the University of
Pennsylvania and it is the paper by Siconolfi (1988), where existence of equilibria is
shown in the case of nominal assets.3 More recent contributions by Aouani and Cor-
net (2009, 2011) deal with numeraire assets4 and more general assumption on the
financial side of the economy.
Several other contributions present either extension of the framework of the model
or deeper analysis of properties of equilibria. In Gori et al. (2014) and Seghir and
Torres-Martinez (2011), authors prove existence in the case of financial constraints
depending on some endogenous variables and in Balasko et al. (1990), Gori et al.
(2013), and Hoelle et al. (2016), authors prove regularity of equilibria in different
specifications of the restricted participation model.
Our model continues the line of research by Aouani and Cornet (2009), Aouani
and Cornet (2011), and Siconolfi (1988). By using a variational inequality approach,
we show the existence of equilibria in a model with numeraire assets and restricted
participation. More precisely, we provide a different and, we believe, easier existence
proof under assumptions at the same level of economic generality as in Aouani and
Cornet (2009). It is well known that a variational inequality problem provides a gen-
eral formulation that encompasses many mathematical problems, including, among
others, nonlinear equations, optimization, complementarity and fixed point problems.
The theory of variational inequalities was introduced in the seventies by Stampacchia
(1964), as an innovative and effective method to solve equilibrium problems arising
in mathematical physics. Nowadays, the variational inequality, with all its general-
izations and extensions, has developed as a powerful tool for the analysis of several
classes of equilibrium problems arising in different branches of applied sciences. For
the state of the art about this topic, see Allevi et al. (2019), Aussel (2014), Aussel
and Dutta (2008), Barbagallo et al. (2014), Berglund and Kwon (2014), Daniele et al.
(2014), Donato et al. (2016), Donato et al. (2018a), Donato et al. (2018b), Friesz
et al. (2001), Hamdouch et al. (2016), Jofrè et al. (2007), Milasi (2013), and Scrimali
(2014) and references therein.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the set-up of the model
and present and discuss our assumptions. To better appreciate the contribution of our
paper, we compare our assumptions on the financial side of economy with those used
in Aouani and Cornet (2009), Aouani and Cornet (2011), and Siconolfi (1988). In
Section 3, we prove some preliminary results on the main ingredients of the model:
the set of no-arbitrage asset prices, the portfolio sets and the budget constraint set-
valued functions. In Section 4, we introduce a sequence of variational inequalities
and we show that the associated sequence of solutions converges to an equilibrium.
3Assets mainly differ in terms of the nature of their returns: if they are measured in terms of units of
account, say euros or dollars, then assets are called nominal assets.
4Returns of numeraire assets are measured in terms of a given, so-called numeraire, good.
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The Appendix lists some well known results on variational inequalities needed in our
framework.
2 Set-Up of theModel
We consider a model of restricted participation with numeraire assets. We assume
that there are 2 periods of time, say today and tomorrow: the state of the world today
is known to individuals, and it is called state 0; in the following period, S states
of the world, with S > 1, are possible. We label each state of the world, or spot,
by s, where s = 0 corresponds to the first period, and we set S0 := {0} ∪ S and
S := {1, ..., S}. In this framework, a commodity may be defined in terms not only
of its physical or chemical characteristics, but also in terms of the period or the state
of nature in which it is available. Spot commodity markets open in the first and
second period, and there are C commodities or goods, with C > 1, in each spot,
labelled by c ∈ C := {1, ..., C} and the total number of commodities available in
the economy is G := (S + 1)C. There are H households, with H > 1, labelled by
h ∈ H := {1, ..., H }, and A assets, with A ≥ 1, labelled by a ∈ A := {1, ..., A}. An
asset is an S + 1 dimensional vector whose first component is the price of the asset,
and the other S components are the yields of that asset in each state, i.e., the amount
of units of a given good, called the numeraire good, that a household has the right
to receive in each state if she purchased one unit of that asset in state 0. We choose
good C as the numeraire.
The time structure of the model is the following one. In the first period, com-
modities and assets are exchanged and first period consumption takes place. Then
uncertainty is resolved, households fulfill their financial commitments and, finally,
exchange and consume second-period commodities. Following the standard notation,
we have that xsch is the consumption of commodity c in state s by household h, e
sc
h is
the endowment of commodity c in state s owned by household h and psc denotes the
price of commodity c in state s and, moreover we set
xsh := (xsch )c∈C ∈ RC, xh := (xsh)s∈S0 ∈ RG, x := (xh)h∈H ∈ RGH ,
esh := (esch )c∈C ∈ RC+, eh := (esh)s∈S0 ∈ RG+, e := (eh)h∈H ∈ RGH+ ,
p s := (psc)c∈C ∈ RC+, p1 := (ps)s∈S ∈ RSC+ , p := (p0, p1) = (ps)s∈S0 ∈ RG+.
and D := (psj )s,j∈S is a S ×S matrix such that psj = 0 for all s = j and pss = psC
for s ∈ S. Each individual h is characterized by a binary relation h on RG which
describes the taste of household: x h y denotes that the consumption y is at least
as desired by the consumer as x; the strict inequality x h y means that x is strictly
preferred to y, i.e., x h y but not y h x. Finally, x ∼h y means that x is
indifferent to y, that is, x h y and y h x. Given the preference relation h, we
define the strictly preference set-valued function Ph as follows Ph : RG ⇒ RG,
Ph(xh) =
{
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We assume that assets pay in each state in units of good C, the so-called numeraire
good. qa represents the price of asset a and bah represents the demand of asset a by
household h; we set




a∈A , b := (bh)h∈H .
The S × A matrix Y := (ysa)s∈S,a∈A is called yield matrix and for any a ∈ A and
s ∈ S, ysa is the yield of asset a in state s, i.e., the number of units of good C
delivered by asset a in state s.
Households are allowed to choose portfolios in a personalized subset Bh of RA;
Bh is the financial constrained set of household h; define B =∏h∈H Bh.
An economy in a financial economy model with numeraire assets and restricted
participation is an element  := (e, P, Y, B) ∈ RGH++ ×P×MS,A×B, whereMS,A
is the set of S × A dimensional matrices, P is the set of the set-valued functions
P = (Ph)h∈H and B is the set of all lists of financial constrained sets of households.
The aim of each household is to have an optimal consumption under the constraints
that in period 0 expenditure for goods and assets is smaller than the value of wealth
in that period and, similarly, in each state in the future, expenditure for consumption
is smaller than wealth increased by the value of the assets yields. For any h ∈ H, we
define the budget set of h at prices (q, p0, p1) as follows:
h(q, p
0, p1) : = {(xh, bh) ∈ RG+ × Bh : 〈p0, x0h − e0h〉C + 〈q, bh〉A ≤ 0,
×〈ps, xsh − esh〉C − psC〈ys, bh〉A ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ S} .
The formal definition of equilibrium is presented below.
Definition 2.1 The vector (̃x, b̃, q̃, p̃) ∈ RGH ×RAH ×RA ×RG+ is an equilibrium
vector for the economy  if
1. for any h ∈ H,
(̃xh, b̃h) ∈ h(̃q, p̃0, p̃1)
(Ph(̃xh) × Bh) ∩ h(̃q, p̃0, p̃1) = ∅; (1)















3. for any a ∈ A, ∑
h∈H
b̃ah = 0.
Household h choice variables are her consumption vector xh ∈ RG and her con-
strained portfolio bh ∈ Bh. We then say that a consumption, portfolio holding,
commodity and asset price vector is an equilibrium vector for the economy  if
at those prices, (̃xh, b̃h) is optimal in household h’s budget set and market clears,
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i.e., commodities demand is smaller than or equal to commodities supply and assets
demand is equal to zero.
The description of the set of no free lunch good prices and no arbitrage assets
prices is a convenient preliminary step in the process of proving existence of equi-
librium prices: prices outside that set cannot be equilibrium prices. In the case of
unrestricted financial participation and numeraire asset, the set of no-arbitrage asset
prices5 for household h (see e.g. Carosi et al. (2009) ) is given by6
Qu(D, Y ) :=
{








q ∈ RA : ∀bh ∈ RA such that DYbh > 0we have 〈q, bh〉A > 0
}
.
By using, a form of the Alternative Lemma (for details, see Lemma 14, page 297,
in Villanacci et al. (2002)), one has that
Qu(D, Y ) =
{







s∈S >> 0, then
Qu (D, Y ) = Qu (Y ) :=
{
q ∈ RA : ∃ν ∈ RS++ such that q = νY
}
.
In the case of restricted participation, it may be that there is b∗h ∈ RA such that[ −q
DY
]
b∗h > 0, but if Bh is bounded in the direction of b∗h, then household h is not
allowed to demand an unbounded amount of that portfolio. Therefore, in the case of




s∈S ∈ RS+, Y ∈ MS,A and B ∈ B,
we define the set7 of no-arbitrage asset prices for household h as
Qh(D, Y, Bh) :=
{






= {q ∈ RA : ∀bh ∈ rec Bhsuch thatDYbh > 0we have 〈q, bh〉A > 0} ,
and the set of no-arbitrage asset prices as




= {q ∈ RA : ∀b ∈ ∪h∈HrecBhsuch that DYb > 0we have 〈q, b〉A > 0}.
From an economic viewpoint, prices in Qh are such that if there exists a portfolio
bh which gives a positive return in some state and non-negative return in each state
tomorrow, i.e., such that DYbh > 0, and which can bought in an unbounded amount
5In the symbol Qu, the superscript u stays for “unrestricted”.
6For vectors y, z ∈ Rn, y ≥ z means that for i = 1, ..., n, yi ≥ zi ; y >> z means that for i = 1, ..., n,
yi > zi and y > z means that y ≥ z but y = z.
7recBh is the recession cone of Bh; see the Appendix for definition and simple facts.
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by household h, i.e., bh ∈ recBh, then that portfolio must cost a positive amount
today, i.e., 〈q, bh〉A > 0. Moreover, define
Qh(Y, Bh) :=
{















s∈S ∈ RS++, one has that





s∈S ∈ RS++, then[−q
Y
]












From now on, we make the following Assumptions.
Assumption 1 For any h ∈ H, eh >> 0.
Assumption 2 For any h ∈ H, the preference set-valued function Ph is
2.1 lower semicontinuous, with open and convex valued;
2.2 strictly increasing in the numeraire good sC, for every s ∈ S, i.e.,
∀x̂h, x̂h ∈ RG+ : x̂h ≥ x̂h with x̂sCh > x̂sCh ⇒ xh ∈ Ph(̂xh);
2.3 locally nonsatiated in state 0, i.e.,
∀xh = (x0h, x1h, . . . , xSh ) ∈ RG+ and ∀ε > 0, ∃x̂h = (̂x0h, x1h, . . . , xSh ) ∈ RG+
such that ‖x̂0h − x0h‖ < ε and x̂h ∈ Ph(xh) .
Assumption 3 For every s ∈ S0, c ∈ C, there exists ε > 0 and h′ ∈ H such that for
every x′h ∈ RG+, Ph′|B(xh′ ,ε)8 is strictly increasing in sc, i.e.,
∀x̂h′, x̂h′ ∈ B (xh′, ε) : x̂h′ ≥ x̂h′ with x̂sch′ > x̂sch′ ⇒ x̂h′ ∈ Ph′ (̂xh′).
Assumption 4 For any h ∈ H,
4.1 Bh is a convex and closed subset of RA and 0A ∈ Bh;
4.2 KerY∩rec Bh = {0A};
4.3 for any p ∈ RG+ such that p0 = 0C and for any q ∈ Cl(Qh (D, Y, B))\ {0A}
there exists bh ∈ Bh such that 〈−q, bh〉A > 0.
Assumption 1 is a survival assumption on the commodity side of the economy: it
helps insuring households are able to buy, and consume, some good in each state of
the world.
8B (xh′ , ε) is the ball centered at xh′ and radius ε
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Assumption 2.1 is relatively general and standard in the general equilibrium
literature.9
Assumption 2.2 is based on the fact that, by construction of the model, households
agreed upon choosing the numeraire good as the unit of measure of asset yields and
therefore “they strongly like that good”.
Assumption 2.3 simply says that households care about consumption in period
zero.
Assumption 3 stresses the fact that each good is appreciated at least by one
household.
Assumption 4.1 is quite general and implies that households are allowed to stay
out of the financial market.
Assumption 4.2 is crucial in several steps in the proofs below and it is implied by
any of the following conditions: Bh is bounded (which implies that rec Bh = {0A});
there are no redundant assets, i.e., rank Y = A (which implies that KerY = {0A}).
Assumption 4.3 is a survival assumption on the financial side of the economy: it
insures that even if the available endowment at time zero has no value, then there
exists an admissible portfolio which generates positive wealth in state zero itself.
Several reasonable conditions are indeed sufficient for Assumption 4.3 (see Propo-
sition 2, page 776, in Aouani and Cornet (2009)). For example, it is enough that for
any households there is a lower bond on some asset demand, or the origin of RA is
an interior point of the portfolio set.
We can observe that our assumptions are at least as general as Siconolfi’s ones
(see Siconolfi (1988)). More precisely, Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3 are identical to those
assumed by the most relevant contributions which are related to our work, i.e. Aouani
and Cornet (2009) and Aouani and Cornet (2011). Assumption 4.2 is not logically
comparable with the corresponding one in Aouani and Cornet (2009) and it is indeed
less general than that one in Aouani and Cornet (2011); on the other, all the economi-
cally interesting conditions proposed in Aouani and Cornet (2011) which imply their
assumption do imply ours as well. Moreover, the proof of existence in Aouani and
Cornet (2011) is a further elaboration on the already not trivial proof in Aouani and
Cornet (2009).
With respect to the consumption side of the model, we point out that we analyze
the case of preferences represented by a continuous, quasiconcave utility function
satisfying some monotonicity assumptions. This approach is line with other contribu-
tions in the literature and it is more general than Siconolfi’s approach (see Siconolfi
(1988), page 276). Our assumptions on preferences are definitely less general than
those analyzed in Aouani and Cornet (2009) and Aouani and Cornet (2011).
3 Preliminary properties
Proposition 3.1 1. ∅ = Qu (D, Y ) ⊆ Q(D, Y, B) ⊆ Cl (Q (D, Y, B)) ;
2. for any γ ∈ R++, one has γ Q(D, Y, B) ⊆ Q(D, Y, B);
9This general way to describe the tastes of the households encompasses the case where the household h
has a preference relation h which is a complete preorder.
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3. Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A} is a cone;
4. Q(Y, B) is open and Q(D, Y, B) is convex;
5. Cl (Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A}) = Cl (Q(D, Y, B));
6. Cl (Q(D, Y, B)) is a convex and closed cone;
7. for any α ∈ R \ {0},







8. for any α ∈ R \ {0},









Proof 1.-2. As observed in Section 2, from a form of the Alternative Lemma,
Qu(D, Y ) =
{
q ∈ RA : ∀bh ∈ RA s.t. DYbh > 0we have 〈q, bh〉A > 0
}
.
Then, the desired conclusions follow from the fact that recBh ⊆ RA and from
the Definition of Q(D, Y, B).
3. Take q ∈ Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A}; we want to show that for any λ ∈ R+,
we have λq ∈ Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A}. If q = 0A or λ = 0, we are done.
If q ∈ Q(D, Y, B) \ {0A} and λ > 0, from item above it follows that
λq ∈ Q(D, Y, B).
4. Convexity follows easily from the definition of Q (D, Y, B). About the open-
ness of Q(Y, B) observe what follows. Suppose otherwise; then there exists
q ∈ Q(Y, B) such that for any n ∈ N, there exists qn /∈ Q(Y, B) and such




n = q. Since for any n ∈ N,





h = 0A. Then, taking also into account that, from Proposi-
tion 6.1 in Appendix, recBh is a cone, we have
bnh‖bnh‖ ∈ recBh, Y
bnh‖bnh‖ > 0 and 〈q
n,
bnh‖bnh‖〉A ≤ 0. Taking limits for
n → +∞, we get b̃0h ∈ recBh, Y b̃0h ≥ 0 and 〈q, b̃0h〉A ≤ 0. We now claim
that Y b̃0h > 0; indeed if we suppose otherwise, we have b̃
0
h ∈ KerY and then,
since b̃0h = 0A, Assumption 4.2 is violated. Then, we showed that there exists
b̃0h ∈ recBh ⊆ Bh such that Y b̃0h > 0 and 〈q, b̃0h〉A ≤ 0, contradicting the
assumption that q ∈ Q(Y, B).
5. Clearly, Cl (Q(D, Y, B)) ⊆ Cl (Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A}). We prove that
Cl (Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A}) ⊆ ClQ(D, Y, B) .
Let q ∈ Cl (Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A}). If q = 0A, we can take an arbitrary q∗ ∈
Q(D, Y, B) and qn = 1n q∗. Since Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A} is a cone, we have{qn}n∈N ⊆ Q(D, Y, B) and lim
n→+∞qn = 0A = q; that is q ∈ ClQ(D, Y, B).
If q = 0A. There exists a sequence {qn}n∈N ⊆ (Q(D, Y, B)∪{0A}) such that
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lim
n→+∞qn = q . Since q = 0A, there exists ν ∈ N such that for any n > ν,
qn = 0A. Hence {qn}n∈N ⊆ Q(D, Y, B), and q ∈ Cl (Q(D, Y, B)).
6. Since Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A} is a cone, then Cl (Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A}) is a cone.
Hence, from Cl (Q(D, Y, B)) = Cl (Q(D, Y, B) ∪ {0A}) and taking into
account that Q(D, Y, B) is convex, Cl (Q(D, Y, B)) is a closed and convex
cone.
7. Firstly, we prove that αQ(D, Y, B) ⊆ Q(D, αY, B
α
). Taken q ∈
αQ(D, Y, B), then there exists q ′ ∈ Q(D, Y, B) such that q = αq ′, that




∈ Q(D, Y, B), we have that ∀b ∈ ∪h∈HrecBh
such that DYb > 0 it follows that 〈 q
α
, b〉A > 0. We have to prove that
∀b̂ ∈ ∪h∈Hrec Bhα such that αDY b̂ > 0, it follows that 〈q, b̂〉A > 0. Taken
b̂ ∈ ∪h∈Hrec Bhα such that αDY b̂ > 0, then there exists h′ ∈ H such that







recBh′ , where last equality follows from Proposition
6.1.2 in the Appendix. Observe that αb̂ ∈ α sgn( 1
α
)recBh′ = |α|recBh′ =
recBh′ , then, by assumption, 〈 qα , αb̂〉A > 0. Then 〈q, b̂〉A > 0 as desired. In
order to prove that Q(D, αY, B
α
) ⊆ αQ(D, Y, B), observe that the argument
is basically symmetric to the above one.
8. ⊆ For any αq ∈ αCl (Q (D, Y, B)), there exists {qn}n∈N ⊆










⊇ From 7. above, it suffices to show that
Cl (αQ (D, Y, B)) ⊇ αCl (Q (D, Y, B)) .
Indeed, f : RA → RA, f (x) = αx is continuous and, from basic
general topology, for any set X ⊆ Rn, f (Cl (X)) ⊆ Cl (f (X)) and
therefore the desired result follows.
Proposition 3.2 Let B ⊆ RA be given.
1. If B is a convex set such that 0A ∈ B, then for any λ ∈ [0, 1], one has λB ⊆ B.
2. If B is nonempty, closed, convex and 0A ∈ B, then for any α ∈ R \ {0} one has
that α B is nonempty, closed, convex and 0A ∈ α B.
3. If Ker Y ∩ recB = {0A}, then for any α, β ∈ R \ {0} one has Ker (β Y ) ∩
rec (α B) = {0A}.
Proof 1. For any λ ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ B one has λb = (1 − λ)0A + λb ∈ B.
2. The thesis follows from properties of B.
3. Since Ker (βY ) := {b ∈ RA : βYb = 0} = Ker Y and rec(αB) = sign(α)recB
(see Proposition 6.1 in the Appendix), one has
Ker (β Y ) ∩ rec (α B) = Ker Y ∩ (sign (α) recB) .
If there exists b = 0A such that b ∈ Ker Y and b ∈ sign (α) recB one has that
b∗ = (signα) b = 0A and b∗ ∈ Ker Y ∩ recB, a contradiction.
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Proposition 3.3 Let a set B satisfying Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 be given. Let also a
sequence {αn}n∈N such that αn = xn‖yn‖ with {xn}n∈N ⊆ B and limn→+∞‖yn‖ = +∞
and lim
n→+∞αn = α be given. Then,
1. for any n ∈ N, αn ∈ recB ⊆ B;
2. α ∈ recB ⊆ B.
Proof 1. Thanks to Proposition 6.1 in Appendix, it is sufficient to prove that for
any λ ≥ 0, λαn ∈ B. For sufficiently large n, one has λ‖yn‖ ∈ (0, 1); then, since





· 0A + λ‖yn‖xn ∈ B
that is αn ∈ recB ⊆ B.
2. Let an arbitrary λ ∈ R+ be given. Since λαn ∈ B and lim
n→+∞λαn = λα, being B
a closed set, one has λα ∈ B. Hence α ∈ recB.
Proposition 3.4 Let a set B satisfying Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 be given. If
{bn}n∈N ⊆ B and there exists ŷ ∈ RS such that lim
n→+∞Ybn = ŷ, then there exists a
subsequence {bnk }k∈N of {bn}n∈N such that lim
k→+∞bnk = b̂ ∈ B.
Proof Given a sequence {bn}n∈N ⊆ B ⊆ RA, then either the sequence {bn}n∈N is
bounded or it is unbounded. If it is bounded, taking into account that B is closed,
then {bn} admits a convergent subsequence {bnk }, that is limk→+∞ bnk = b̂ ∈ B.
Now, we want to show that the sequence {bn}n∈N cannot be unbounded. Suppose
otherwise limn→+∞ ||bn|| = +∞. Define bn = bn||bn|| ∈ ∂B(0A, 1), then {bn} admits
a convergent subsequence {bnk } such that limk→+∞ bnk = b = 0A. From Proposition
3.3.2, one has that b ∈recB ⊆ B. Moreover
lim
k→+∞ Ybnk = Yb and limk→+∞ Ybnk = limk→+∞ Ybnk
1
||bnk ||
= ŷ · 0 = 0S
Hence Yb = 0S . Summarizing, we have that b = 0A, b ∈ rec B and Yb = 0S . Then
Ker Y∩ rec B = {0A}, contradicting Assumption 4.2.
We now define ρ :=∑s∈S
∑
a∈A ysa . The proposition below says that there is no
loss of generality in assuming ρ ≥ 0, a condition which is crucial in the arguments
below.
Let P∗ be the set of the preferences set-valued functions satisfying Assumptions
2 and 3; let F10 be the family of pairs (Y, B) ∈ MS,A × B satisfying Assumptions
4 and define E = RGH++ × P∗ × F to be the set of economies satisfying all our
maintained assumptions.
10F stays for financial structure.
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Proposition 3.5 For any α ∈ R\ {0},









x, b̃, q̃, p̃
)








Proof 1. Thanks to Propositions 3.1, 3.2, economy  satisfies Assumptions 1, 2,
3 and 4 .1 and 4.2 if and only if α satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4.1 and
4.2. About Assumption 4.3, observe what follows. We assume that economy 







\ {0A}, from Proposition 3.1.8,
q̂
α
∈ Cl (Qh(D, Y, Bh)) \ {0A}. Then, by Assumption 4.3, there exists bh ∈ Bh
such that 〈 q̂
α
, bh〉A < 0, that is equivalent to have there exists b̂h = bhα ∈ Bhα such
that 〈̂q, b̂h〉A < 0, as desired. The proof of the opposite implication is symmetric
to the above one.






∈ h(α q̃, p̃ 0, p̃ 1), then
the desired result holds true.
Remark 3.1 Thanks to Proposition 3.5, in order to prove existence of equilibria, we
can assume that ρ ≥ 0. Indeed, let  = (e, Y, B, P ) be an economy with associated
ρ being strictly negative and consider the economy −1 := (e, −Y, −B, P ) , whose
associated ρ is strictly positive. Then, from Proposition 3.5, if (̃x, b̃, q̃, p̃) is an equi-
librium for −1, then (̃x, −b̃, −q̃, p̃) is an equilibrium for the original economy
.
The following proposition gives some preliminary properties.
Proposition 3.6 Let Assumptions 2 be satisfied. If for any h ∈ H, (̃xh, b̃h) is optimal
in the budget constraints set h(̃q, p̃0, p̃1), then
1. p̃ 0 > 0, (p̃ s C)s∈S >> 0;
2. for any h ∈ H,
〈p̃ 0, x̃0h − e0h〉C + 〈̃q, b̃h〉A = 0 ,
〈p̃ s , x̃sh − esh〉C − p̃ sC〈ys, b̃h〉A = 0, ∀s ∈ S ;




(̃x0h − e0h)〉C + 〈̃q,
∑
h∈H




(̃xsh − esh)〉C − p̃ sC〈ys,
∑
h∈H
b̃h〉A = 0, ∀s ∈ S ;
4. q̃ ∈ Q(D, Y, B) = Q(Y, B).
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Proof 1. We first prove that p̃ 0 > 0. Suppose p̃0 = 0C . By Assumption 2.3, we
have that for any ε > 0, there exists x̂h = (̂x0h, x̃1h, . . . , x̃Sh ) ∈ RG+ ∩ B (̃xh, ε)
such that x̂h ∈ Ph(̃xh). Moreover (̂xh, b̃h) ∈ h(̃q, p̃0, p̃1), contradicting the
fact that x̃h verifies statement (1).
We now prove that (p̃ s C)s∈S >> 0. Suppose that there exists s∗ ∈ S0 such
that p̃ s






h + 1 if sc = s∗C,
x̃sch otherwise.
Then, for any h ∈ H, (̂xh, b̃h
) ∈ h(̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1) and, since x̂h ≥ x̃h and x̂s∗Ch >
x̃h
s∗C , from Assumption 2.2 one has x̂h ∈ Ph (̃xh), contradicting the fact that x̃h
verifies statement (1).
2. Suppose otherwise; then there exists h ∈ H such that
either 〈p̃ 0, x̃0h − e0h〉C + 〈̃q, b̃h〉A < 0,
or ∃s ∈ S such that 〈p̃ s , x̃sh − esh〉C − p̃sC〈ys, b̃h〉A < 0.
Suppose 〈p̃, x̃0h − e0h〉C + 〈̃q, b̃h〉A < 0. There exists ε > 0 such that
∀x0h ∈ RC+ s. t . ‖x0h − x̃0h‖ < ε ⇒ 〈p̃0, x0h − e0h〉C + 〈̃q, b̃h〉A < 0 . (2)
From Assumption 2.3, there exists x̂h = (̂x0h, x̃1h, . . . , x̃Sh ) ∈ RC+ such that
‖x̂0h − x̃0h‖ < ε and x̂h ∈ Ph(̃xh). Moreover, from Eq. 2 it follows (̂xh, b̃h) ∈
h(̃q, p̃
0, p̃1), contradicting the fact that x̃h verifies (1).
Assume now that 〈p̃ s , x̃sh − esh〉C − p̃sC〈ys, b̃h〉A < 0, for some s ∈ S. Since
(p̃sC)s∈S >> 0, define
x̂sch :=
{
x̃ sCh − 1p̃sC
(〈p̃s , x̃h s − esh〉C − p̃sC〈ys, b̃h〉A
)





) ∈ h(̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1) and from Assumption 2.2 one has x̂h ∈ Ph (̃xh),
contradicting the fact that x̃h verifies (1).
3. It follows from summing up with respect to h the equalities obtained above.
4. Suppose that q̃ /∈ Q(D, Y, B), i.e., there exists h′ ∈ H and b∗






h′ > 0. First, suppose that 〈̃q, b∗h′ 〉A < 0 and D̃Yb∗h′ ≥ 0. Then,
one has
〈p̃0, x̃0h′ − e0h′ 〉C + 〈̃q, (̃bh′ + b∗h′)〉A < 0 .
Then, there exists ε > 0 such that
∀x0h′ ∈ RC+ s. t . ‖x0h′ − x̃0h′‖ < ε ⇒ 〈p̃0, x0h′ −e0h′ 〉C +〈̃q, (̃bh′ −b∗h′)〉A < 0 .
(3)
From Assumption 2.3, there exists x̂h′ = (̂x0h′ , x̃1h′ , . . . , x̃Sh′) ∈ RG+ such that
‖x̂0
h′ − x̃0h′‖ < ε and x̂h′ ∈ Ph(̃xh′). Moreover, from Eq. 3 it follows (̂xh′ , (̃bh′ +
b∗
h′)) ∈ h′ (̃q, p̃0, p̃1), contradicting the fact that x̃h′ satisfies (1).
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Assume now that 〈̃q, b∗
h′ 〉A ≤ 0 and D̃Yb∗h′ > 0. Let s∗ ∈ S be a state corre-














h′ 〉A if sc = s∗C,
x̃sc
h′ otherwise,
and b̂h′ = b̃h′ + b∗h′ .
This vector satisfies all budget constraints and from Assumption 2.3, we obtain
a contradiction. Hence q̃ ∈ Q(D, Y, B).
We consider the following price sets.
0 :=
{























For any h ∈ H, let h :  ⇒ RG+ × Bh be the budget set-valued function,
h(q, p
0, p1) : = {(xh, bh) ∈ RG+ × Bh : 〈p0, x0h − e0h〉C + 〈q, bh〉A ≤ 0,









The following proposition describes useful properties of h.
Proposition 3.7 Let Assumptions 4.1, 4.2 be satisfied. Then, for any h ∈ H, the
set-valued function h is
1. nonempty and convex valued;
2. closed;
3. compact valued for any
(
q, p0, p1
) ∈  such that p ∈ RG++ and q ∈ Q(Y, B);
4. lower semicontinuous for any
(
q, p0, p1
) ∈  such that (psC)
s∈S0 >> 0;
5. upper semicontinuous for any
(
q, p0, p1
) ∈  such that p ∈ RG++ and q ∈
Q(Y, B).11
Proof 1. Since 0A ∈ Bh (from Assumption 4.1), one has that (eh, 0A) ∈ RG+ × Bh,







) ∈ . Convexity is obvious.
2. Let {(qn, p0n, p1n












and let {(xh,n, bh,n
















) = (xh, bh). Since Bh is a closed set, one




s∈S ∈ RS++, then Qh(Y,Bh) = Qh(D, Y, Bh).
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has (xh, bh) ∈ RG+ × Bh and from assumptions






〈psn, xsh,n − esh〉C − psCn 〈ys, bh,n〉A ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ S,
taking limits we get that (xh, bh) ∈ h(q, p0, p1). Then h is closed.
3. Since Bh is a closed set and h is defined in terms of weak inequalities via con-
tinuous function, it is closed valued. We are left with showing that h is bounded









)∥∥ = +∞. Consider
αn :=
(
α0,n, (αs,n)s∈S , αb,n








Since, for every n ∈ N, ‖αn‖ = 1, the sequence {αn}n∈N lies in the boundary of
the closed ball of radius 1, ∂B (0, 1); then, without loss of generality, one has
lim
n→∞ αn = α := (α0, (αs)s∈S , αb) ,
and α is such that α ∈ ∂B(0, 1), α0 ≥ 0, αs ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S, α = 0 and from
Proposition 3.3.2, αb ∈ recBh. Moreover, since (xh,n, bh,n) ∈ h(q, p 0, p1) ,
for all n ∈ N, one has:
〈p0, α0,n〉C − 1∥∥(xh,n, αb,n






〈ps, αs,n〉C − 1∥∥(xh,n, αb,n
)∥∥ 〈ps, esh〉C − psC〈ys, αb,n〉A ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ S .
and, taking limits for n → +∞, we get
〈p0, α0〉C + 〈q, αb〉A ≤ 0, 〈ps, αs〉C − psC〈ys, αb〉A ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ S .
(4)
We, now, distinguish two cases:
◦ If(αs)s∈S0 = 0, that is there exists s ∈ S0 such that αs > 0. Then, from
Eq. 4, one has, for some s ∈ S,
− 〈q, αb〉A ≥ 〈p0, α0〉C > 0 or psC〈ys, αb〉A ≥ 〈ps, αs〉C > 0,
with αb ∈ recBh and 〈ps, αs〉C ≥ 0 for any s ∈ S0, which contradicts the
fact that q ∈ Q(Y, B).
◦ If αb = 0. We suppose that αs = 0 for any s ∈ S0. From Eq. 4, it follows
− 〈q, αb〉A ≥ 0 and psC〈ys, αb〉A ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S .
If 〈ys, αb〉A > 0 for some s ∈ S, since p ∈ RG++, psC〈ys, αb〉A > 0 with
αb ∈ recBh, this contradicts the fact that q ∈ Q(Y, B).
If 〈ys, αb〉A = 0 for all s ∈ S, one has αb = 0A and αb ∈ Ker Y ∩ recBh,
and this contradicts Assumption 4.2.
Hence, we can conclude that, for any
(
q, p0, p1
) ∈  such that p ∈ RG++ and
q ∈ Q(Y, B), h(q, p0, p1) is a compact set.
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4. To prove the lower semicontinuity of h, we define the set-valued function ̃h :




̃(q, p0, p1) := {(xh, bh) ∈ RG+ × Bh : 〈p0, x0h − e0h〉C + 〈q, bh〉A < 0,
〈ps, xsh − esh〉C − psC〈ys, bh〉A < 0 ∀s ∈ S} .
Since Cl (̃h) = h and since a set-valued function is lower semicontinuous if
and only if its closure is lower semicontinuous, it is sufficient to prove that ̃h
is lower semicontinuous. Firstly, we have (xh, bh) = (0G, 0A) ∈ ̃h(q, p0, p1),
that is ̃h is nonempty valued. Observe that, from Proposition 4 in Ok (2007) p.
229, to show the lower semicontinuity of ̃h it is sufficient to prove that for every
sequence {(qn, p0n, p 1n)}n∈N such that limn→+∞(qn, p0n, p1n) = (q, p0, p 1) and
any (xh, bh) ∈ ̃h(q, p0, p1), there exists {(xh,n, bh,n)}n∈N ⊆ RG+ × Bh such
that lim



















〈p0, x0h − e0h〉C + 〈q, bh〉A
)
< 0,








〈ps, xsh−esh〉C −psC〈ys, bh〉A
)
< 0,
there exists ν ∈ N such that for all n > ν one has (xh, bh) ∈ ̃h(qn, p0n, p1n)
. Then, we can choose the sequence {(xh,n, bh,n)}n∈N as (xh,n, bh,n) = (xh, bh)
and we can conclude that ̃h is lower semicontinuous.
5. It follows from the four results above and Lemma 1, page 33, in Hildebrand
(1974).
4 The Sequence of Variational Inequality Problems
First of all we observe that, given our assumptions on the utility functions, the no-
free lunch good price set isRG++. Now, we consider a non-zero lower bound on prices
and to this aim we define the following prices sets
n0 :=
{






























) ∈ n be given; the following properties hold true.
1. Q(D, Y, B) = Q(Y, B) := Q and Qu (D, Y ) = Qu (Y ) := Qu;
2. for any n ∈ N, one has
1
n













+ Cl (Q) ;
3. let {qn}n∈N be a sequence such that limn→+∞ qn = q and q ∈ Q. Then, there







4. q ∈ Q and p0 ∈ RS++.
Proof 1. It follows from Remark 2.1.
2. By definition of Qu, point 1. above and from Proposition 3.1.1, 1
n
1SY ∈ Qu ⊆
Q ⊆ Cl (Q).
Since from Proposition 3.1, Cl (Q) is a convex cone,12 we do have that for
any q ∈ Cl (Q), 1
n

















3. Since q ∈ Q = intQ, there exists δ > 0 and ν1 ∈ N such that for all n > ν1 it
results qn ∈ B
(
q, δ2





























− q‖ ≤ 1
n









∈ B(q, δ) ⊆ Q.






+Cl (Q), then there exists
q ′ ∈ Cl (Q) such that
q = 1
n

















1SY ∈ Q, where Q is open, 1n1SY ∈ Int(Q). Moreover, since Cl (Q) is




1SY + nq ′
)
∈ Cl (Q). Then, since q
can be written as a convex combination of an element in the interior of Q and
an element in the closure of Q, one has q ∈ Int (Q) = Q.
12Recall that A ⊆ Rn is a convex cone if and only if ∀a, b ∈ A, λ,μ ≥ 0, λa + μb ∈ A.
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1. n0 is nonempty, convex, compact;
2. ns is nonempty, convex, compact for any s ∈ S;
3. n is nonempty, convex, compact.















ρ if c = C,
and q̂ := 1
n
1SY ,
One has (̂q, p̂ 0) ∈ n0. Indeed, p̂0 ≥ 1n1C . For c = C, the result is obvious; for
c = C, we have









⇔ n ≥ C + ρ
1 + ρ
which is true since, from Proposition 3.5, 1 + ρ > 0 and since we assumed
n ≥ C.







Cl (Q) and, from Proposition 4.1.2, q̂ ∈ Cl (Q). Moreover, q̂ ≥ −n1A if and


























ysa = 1+ρ .
Then (̂q, p̂ 0) ∈ n0.
n0 is closed.
By definition of n0, we have that it is a closed set because defined in terms





+ Cl (Q) is the sum of a compact set and a closed set and therefore it
is closed.
n0 is bounded.
By definition,n0 is bounded below. In order to prove that it is bounded above,
observe that, by definition q ≥ −n1A, i.e., for any a ∈ A, qa ≥ −n and
then we also have
∑
a∈A qa ≥ −nA and −
∑
a∈A qa ≤ nA. Then, for any




qa ≤ 1+ρ +nA; for any a′ ∈ A, qa′ =




qa ≤ 1 + ρ + n(A − 1).
n0 is convex.
It follows from the convexity of Cl (Q) given in Proposition 3.1.6.
ns is nonempty.
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if c = C,
1 − C−1
n
if c = C.
One has p̂ s ∈ ns . Indeed, clearly for c = C, p̂ s ≥ 1n1C ; for c = C,
p̂ s ≥ 1
n
1C if and only if n ≥ C. Moreover ∑
c∈C






ns is a closed subset of the simplex, which is a compact set, and therefore 
n
s
is a compact set, as well.
ns is convex.
It follows from the convexity of s .
n is nonempty, compact and convex.
It follows from all properties of sets ns , with s ∈ S0.
Now, in order to relate the consumer h’s maximization problem with a variational
problem, we adapt the definition of the operator given in Aussel and Dutta (2008)
(see also Eq. 37 of the Appendix). To this aim, for any h ∈ H, we consider the
set-valued function
Gh : RG ⇒ RG such that
Gh(xh) := conv
(
N>h (xh) ∩ S(0, 1)
) ∀xh ∈ RG,
where N>h (xh) is the normal cone to the convex set Ph(xh) defined in the Appendix.
Let f CC be the element of the canonical base of R
C with 1 in the component C.
Now, we introduce the following GQVIn:
Find
(









〈−gn, xn − x̃n〉GH + 〈
∑
h∈H
b̃h,n, qn − q̃n〉A + 〈
∑
h∈H







(̃xsh,n − esh − f CC 〈ys, b̃h〉A), psn − p̃ sn 〉C ≤ 0,
∀
(






∈ (̃qn, p̃ 0n, p̃1n) × n. (5)
Remark 4.1
(






is a solution to GQVIn (5) if and only if,
simultaneously we have,
for any h ∈ H,




b̃h,n, qn − q̃n〉A + 〈
∑
h∈H
(̃x 0h,n − e0h), p0n − p̃ 0n〉C ≤ 0 ∀(qn, p0n) ∈ n0; (7)




(̃xsh,n − esh − f CC 〈ys, b̃h〉A), p sn − p̃ sn〉C ≤ 0, ∀psn ∈ ns . (8)
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The above equivalence follows by replacing in Eq. 5, respectively,
(



















n)) = (̃xn, b̃n), (qn, p0n, p̃1n))
and (












n )s′∈S\s , psn)
)
.
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold true. For any n ∈ N, with n ≥ C and
n2 > maxa∈A{−
∑
s∈S ysa}, GQVIn (5) admits at least one solution.
Proof To get the desired result, we apply Theorem 4 in the Appendix. Consis-
tently with Definition A.2 in the Appendix, the variational problem (5) represents a
generalized quasi-variational inequality associated with
C := conv ( (n))× n
and, for any
(





) ∈ (qn, p0n, p1n) × n,
S
(









































Now, we have to check that Assumptions of Theorem 4 are satisfied.
 C is nonempty, convex, compact. From Proposition 4.2, n is nonempty, convex
and compact and, from Proposition 3.7, for any h ∈ H, h is nonempty, con-
vex, compact valued, closed, lower semicontinuous and upper semicontinuous
on n. Then, (n) := ∏h∈H h(n) is nonempty, convex, compact valued,
closed, lower semicontinuous and upper semicontinuous as well (see Proposi-
tions 4 and 8 of Hildebrand (1974)). Hence, (n) is compact (see Proposition
3 of Hildebrand (1974)) and then conv( (n)) is convex and compact.
 The set-valued functionS(·) is nonempty, convex, compact valued, closed, lower
semicontinuous and upper semicontinuous . It follows from what said above.
 The set-valued function Φ(·) is nonempty, convex, compact valued, closed and
upper semicontinuous. From Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, one has Ph(xh) = ∅ for all
xh ∈ RG; then the set-valued function Gh is equal to the set-valued function
G̃, presented in Eq. 37 in the Appendix. Then, for any h ∈ H, we have that
Gh is nonempty, convex, compact valued, closed and upper semicontinuous (see
Proposition 5 in the Appendix) and furthermore the other components of Φ are
continuous functions (see Proposition 4 of Hildebrand (1974)).
All assumptions of Theorem 4 are satisfied, then GQVIn (5) associated with
C, S and Φ admits at least a solution.
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Theorem 2 Let Assumptions 2 be satisfied. For any n ∈ N such that
n ≥ C, n > maxa∈A
{−∑s∈S ysa
}










be a solution to GQVIn (5). Then, one has
(i) for any h ∈ H, (̃xh,n, b̃h,n) is optimal in the constraints set h((̃qn, p̃ 0n), p̃1n).
(ii) for any h ∈ H and s ∈ S,
〈p̃ 0n, x̃0h,n − e0h〉C + 〈̃qn, b̃h,n〉A = 0, (9)
〈p̃ sn, x̃sh,n − esh〉C = p̃ sCn 〈ys, b̃h,n〉; (10)




(̃x0h,n − e0h)〉C + 〈̃qn,
∑
h∈H








(iv) for any h ∈ H, c ∈ C and s ∈ S0,













Proof Thanks to Remark 4.11, for any h ∈ H, (̃xh,n, b̃h,n) is a solution to GVIn (6),
(̃qn, p̃
0
n) is a solution to Eq. 7 and for all s ∈ S, p̃sn is a solution to Eq. 8.





n): there exists z̃h ∈ Ph(̃xh,n) ∩ h((̃qn, p̃ 0n), p̃1n). Since
Ph(̃xh,n) is an open set, there exists α > 0 such that z := z̃h + αgh,n ∈
Ph(̃xh,n). Hence, since gh,n ∈ N>(x̃h,n), one has 〈gh,n, z − x̃h,n〉 =
α‖gh,n‖2 ≤ 0, that is ‖gh,n‖ = 0. A contradiction with gh,n = 0.13





n) and from Proposition 3.6.




b̃h,n, qn〉A + 〈
∑
h∈H
(̃x 0h,n − e0h), p0n〉C ≤ 0 ∀(qn, p0n) ∈ n0; (14)




(̃xsh,n − esh), p sn〉C − psCn 〈ys,
∑
h∈H











b̃h,n〉A ≤ 0, ∀psn ∈ ns . (15)
13Also in the case of non-complete and non-transitive preferences, we can adapt the results obtained in
Aussel (2014) and Aussel and Dutta (2008) and Milasi et al. (2019)
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Summing up (14) and (15), for any (qn, p0n, p
1




b̃h,n, qn〉A + 〈
∑
h∈H
















b̃h,n〉A ≤ 0 . (16)
Now, choose qn = 1SY and p̂ sc = 1C 14 for any c ∈ C and




, qn =∑s∈S ys ≥ −n1A, and
∑



















































































Proposition 4.3 Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4.3 be satisfied.
Let
{(






n∈N be the sequence such that, for any n ∈ N with











is a solution to
GQVIn (5). Then there exists a subsequence converging to ((̃x, b̃), (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1)) such
that (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1) ∈  with p̃ >> 0, q̃ ∈ Q and (̃x, b̃) ∈ (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1).
Proof One has:
 limn→+∞(̃qn, p̃ 0n, p̃ 1n) = (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1) ∈  .
Since {(̃qn, p̃ 0n)}n∈N ⊆ 0 and for any s ∈ S, {p̃ sn}n∈N ⊆ s , with 0 and s




n) = (̃q, p̃ 0) ∈ 0, lim
n→+∞ p̃
s
n = p̃ s ∈ s .
Hence (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1) ∈ .
Foranyh ∈ H, lim






since by assumption n ≥ C.
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From inequality (13), for any h ∈ H, s ∈ S0 and c ∈ C, the sequence {̃xsch,n}n∈N is
bounded, then claim holds.
Foranys ∈ S, p̃ s >> 0.
Suppose that there exist s′ ∈ S and c′ ∈ C such that p̃s′c′ = 0. From Assumption
3 there exists ε > 0 and h′ ∈ H such that Ph′|B(xh′ ,ε) is strictly increasing in s′c′.








h′ 〉C if sc=s′c′,
(1−p̃s′c′n )̃xsch′,n otherwise,
b̂h′,n :=(1−p̃s′c′n )̃bh′,n
with m ∈ N. Firstly we observe that, since for n sufficiently large (1− p̃s′c′n ) ∈ (0, 1],















′ ∈ s′ and from Assumption 1, we have that 〈p̃s′ , es′
h′ 〉C > 0. Since
x̂h′ ≥ x̃h′ and x̂s′c′h′ > x̃s
′c′
h′ , and for m sufficiently large x̂h′ ∈ B (xh′ , ε), from
Assumption 3, it follows that x̂h′ ∈ Ph(̃xh′).
Moreover, from Assumption on preference set-valued map (Ph(̃xh′) is an open set)






Now, we show that
(̂xh′,n, b̂h′,n) ∈ h′ (̃qn, p̃0n, p̃1n). (18)
Taking into account that (̃xh′,n, b̃h′,n) ∈ h′ (̃qn, p̃0n, p̃1n), to check (18), we go through
3 steps.
Step 1. At s = 0. We have that
〈p̃0n, x̂0h′,n − e0h′ 〉C + 〈̃qn, b̂h′,n〉A
= (1−p̃s′c′n )
[
〈p̃0n, x̃0h′,n− e0h′ 〉C +〈qn, b̃h′,n〉A
]
−p̃s′c′n 〈p̃0n, e0h′ 〉C <0. (19)
Step 2. At s ∈ S\ {s′}.
We have that
〈p̃sn, x̂sh′,n − esh′ 〉C − p̃sCn 〈ys, b̂h′,n〉A
= (1−p̃s′c′n )
[
〈p̃sn, x̃sh′,n−esh′ 〉C −p̃sCn 〈ys, b̃h′,n〉A
]
−p̃s′c′n 〈p̃sn, esh′ 〉C <0. (20)
Step 3. At s = s′.
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h′ 〉C < 0. (21)
Then, from Eqs. 19, 20 and 21 claim (18) is proved. Hence (17) contradicts the
fact that (̃xh′,n, b̃h′,n) is optimal in h(((q̃n, p̃n), p̃1n)). Then, for any s ∈ S it results
that p̃sc > 0 for any c ∈ C.
 p̃ 0 >> 0.
Suppose our claim is false, i.e., there exists c′ ∈ C such that p̃ 0c = 0. Then either at
least a component in p̃ 0 is zero or all components are zero. Both cases are analyzed
below.
Case 1. p̃0 > 0.
We suppose that there exists c′ ∈ C such that p̃0c′ = 0. From Assumption 3 there
exists ε > 0 and h′ ∈ H such that Ph′|B(xh′ ,ε) is strictly increasing in 0c′. Define




(1 − p̃0c′n )̃x0c′h′,n + 1m 〈p̃0n, e0h′ 〉C if sc = 0c′,
(1 − p̃0c′n )̃xsch′,n otherwise,







h′ + 1m 〈p̃0, e0h′ 〉C if sc = 0c′,
x̃sc
h′ otherwise.
Since p̃0c > 0 for some c ∈ C and, from Assumption 1, we have that 〈p̃0, e0
h′ 〉C >
0. Since x̂h′ ≥ x̃h′ and x̂0c′h′ > x̃0c
′
h′ , and for m sufficiently large x̂h′ ∈ B (xh′, ε), from
Assumption 3, it follows that x̂h′ ∈ P ′h(̃xh′).






Now, we show that
(̂xh′,n, b̂h′,n) ∈ h′ (̃qn, p̃0n, p̃1n). (23)
Taking into account that (̃xh′,n, b̃h′,n) ∈ h′ (̃qn, p̃0n, p̃1n), to check (23), we go
through 2 steps.
Step 1. At s = 0.
We have that
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Step 2. At s ∈ S.
We have that
〈p̃sn, x̂sh′,n − esh′ 〉C − p̃sCn 〈ys, b̂h′,n〉A
= (1−p̃0c′n )
[
〈p̃sn, x̃sh′,n−esh′ 〉C −p̃sCn 〈ys, b̃h′,n〉A
]
−p̃0c′n 〈p̃sn, esh′ 〉C <0. (25)
Then, from Eqs. 24 and 25 claim (23) is proved. Hence (22) contradicts the fact
that (̃xh′,n, b̃h′,n) is optimal in h((q̃n, p̃n), p̃1n). Then, it results that p̃
0c > 0 for any
c ∈ C.
Case 2. p̃0 = 0C and therefore q̃ = 0A.
From Assumption 3 there exists ε > 0 and h′ ∈ H such that Ph′|B(xh′ ,ε) is strictly
increasing in 0c′. FromAssumption 4.3, there exists b∗
h′ ∈ Bh′ such that 〈−q̃, b∗h′ 〉A >








〉A if sc = 0c′,
(1 − p̃0c′n )̃xsch′,n otherwise.








p̃sCn 〈−ys, b∗h′ 〉A
〈p̃sn, esh′ 〉C





Observe that, since the sequence {p̃1n}n∈N converges to p̃1 >> 0, the maximum





∈ Bh′ . Being p̃0 = 0C , for n ∈ N sufficiently large, p̃0c′n ∈ (0, 1) and then,
we have b̂h′,n ∈ Bh′ .










〉A if sc = 0c′,
x̃sc
h′ otherwise.
Since x̂h′ ≥ x̃h′ and x̂0c′h′ > x̃0c
′
h′ , and for m sufficiently large x̂h′ ∈ B (xh′ , ε), from
Assumption 3, it follows that x̂h′ ∈ Ph′ (̃xh′). Moreover, since Ph has open values,






Now, we show that
(̂xh′,n, b̂h′,n) ∈ h′ (̃qn, p̃0n, p̃1n). (28)








, to check (28), we go
through 2 steps.
Step 1. At s = 0.
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We have that




〈p̃0n, x̃0h′,n − e0h′ 〉C + 〈̃qn, b̃h′,n〉A
]


























Step 2. At s ∈ S.
We have that















where the inequality holds true for the definition of αh′ . This fact contradicts that
(̃xh′,n, b̃h′,n) is optimal in h(((q̃n, p̃n), p̃1n)). Then, it results that p̃
0c > 0 for any
c ∈ C.
 lim
n→+∞ b̃n = b̃ ∈ B.
From Eq. 10, taking limits, for all s ∈ S, we get
p̃sC〈ys, lim
n→+∞ b̃h,n〉C = 〈p̃
s , x̃sh − esh〉C .
Then, from Proposition 3.4, we can conclude that for any h ∈ H, limn→+∞ b̃h,n =
b̃h ∈ Bh.
 (̃x, b̃) ∈ (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1).
It follows from the fact that (̃x, b̃) ∈ RGH+ × B and from Proposition 3.7,  is
closed.
 q̃ ∈ Q.
The proof of this claim is similar to the one given in Proposition 3.6.
Theorem 3 Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 be satisfied. Then, for any financial econ-
omy  ∈ E , there exists an equilibrium vector with restricted participation and
numeraire assets.
Proof From Theorem 1, for any n ∈ N, with n ≥ C and n2 > maxa∈A{−∑s∈S ysa}
there exists
(





) ∈ (̃qn, p̃ 0n, p̃ 1n) × n solution to GQVIn (5).
Let
{(



















(̃x, b̃), (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1)
)
with (̃x, b̃) ∈ (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1), p̃ 0 >> 0, p̃ 1 >> 0 and q ∈ Q. Moreover, we
observe that for any sequence {ln}n∈N such that limn→+∞ ln = l > 0 there existsN ∈
N such that l > 1
N
and, from the theorem of permanence of sign for sequences, there
exists ν ∈ N such for any n > ν, ln > 1N . Then defined ν = max{ν, N}, one has, for
any n > ν ≥ N , ln > 1N > 1n . Then, since for all s ∈ S0 limn→+∞ p̃ sn = p̃ s >> 0,
then there exist ν such that, for all n > ν, one has p̃sn >
1
n
1C . We now prove that the
vector (̃x, b̃, q̃, p̃ 0, p̃ 1) is an equilibrium vector according to Definition 2.1.
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 Condition (1). Fixed h ∈ H, we suppose that there exists (xh, bh) ∈ (Ph(̃xh) ×
Bh) ∩ h(̃q, p̃0, p̃1). From Proposition 3.7 and the fact that p̃ >> 0, we
have that h is lower semicontinuous at (̃q, p̃ 0, p̃ 1), that is there exists
a sequence {(xh,n, bh,n)}n∈N such that (xh,n, bh,n) ∈ h(̃qn, p̃ 0n, p̃ 1n) and
limn+∞(xh,n, bh,n) = (xh, bh). Since Ph(x̃h) is an open set, it follows that there
exists n1 such that xh,n ∈ Ph(x̃h), for all n > n1. But this contradicts the fact that
(x̃h,n, b̃h,n) is optimal on h(̃qn, p̃ 0n, p̃
1
n).
 Condition 3. Since q̃ ∈ Q = intQ, there exists ε > 0 such that B(̃q, ε) ⊆ Q.
For all a′ ∈ A, let f a′A be the element of the canonical basis ofRA with component











q̂n := (1− λ̂)(̃qn+δf a′A ) and p̂ 0n := (1− λ̂)p̃ 0n with λ̂ :=
δ
1 + ρ + δ ∈ (0, 1)
and
q̂n := (1+λ̂)(̃qn−δf a
′
A ) and p̂
0
n := (1+λ̂)p̃ 0n with λ̂ :=
δ
1 + ρ − δ ∈ (0, 1) .
We have (̂qn, p̂0n), (̂qn, p̂
0
n) ∈ 0n. Indeed:
(i)
∑
c∈C p̂ 0cn +
∑
a∈A q̂ an = (1− λ̂)
(∑
c∈C p̃ 0cn +
∑
a∈A q̃ an
)+ (1− λ̂)δ =














− (1+ λ̂)δ = (1+ λ̂)(1+ ρ − δ) = 1+ ρ




n = (1 − λ̂)p̃ 0 >> 0 lim
n→+∞ p̂
0
n = (1 + λ̂)p̃ 0 >> 0









n→+∞ q̂n = (1− λ̂)(̃q + δf
a′




(1 − λ̂)(̃q + δf a′A ) ∈ Q and (1 + λ̂)(̃q − δf a
′
A ) ∈ Q .
Indeed ‖(1 − λ̂)(̃q + δf a′A ) − q̃‖ = ‖ 1+ρ1+ρ+δ (̃q + δf a
′
A ) − q̃‖ ≤
≤ 1
1 + ρ + δ ‖(1 + ρ)(̃q + δf
a′
A ) − (1 + ρ)̃q − δq̃‖ < ‖(1 + ρ)δf a
′
A + δq̃‖
< δ ((1 + ρ) + ‖q̃‖) < ε ⇒ (1 − λ̂)(̃q + δf a′A ) ∈ B(̃q, ε) ⊆ Q .
Author's personal copy
M.B. Donato et al.
and ‖(1 + λ̂)(̃q − δf a′A ) − q̃‖ = ‖ 1+ρ1+ρ−δ (̃q − δf a
′
A ) − q̃‖ ≤
≤ 1
1 + ρ − δ ‖(1+ ρ)(̃q − δf
a′
A ) − (1+ ρ)̃q + δq̃‖ < ‖ − (1+ ρ)δf a
′
A + δq̃‖
≤ δ ((1 + ρ) + ‖q̃‖) < ε ⇒ (1 + λ̂)(̃q − δf a′A ) ∈ B(̃q, ε) ⊆ Q .








(iv) From Eq. 29, it follows that q̂n ≥ −n1A and q̂n ≥ −n1A.
Then, from (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv), we have that (̂q, p̂0), (̂q, p̂
0
) ∈ n0. From Eqs. 7




b̃h,n, q̂n − q̃n〉A + 〈
∑
h∈H






b̃h,n, q̃n〉A + 〈
∑
h∈H
(̃x 0h,n − e0h), p̃ 0n〉C
)
















h,n ≤ 0 (30)
and 〈∑h∈H b̃h,n, q̂n − q̃n〉A + 〈
∑
h∈H(̃x 0h,n − e0h), p̂
0






b̃h,n, q̃n〉A + 〈
∑
h∈H
(̃x 0h,n − e0h), p̃ 0n〉C
)
















h,n ≥ 0 (31)





h,n = 0. (32)
Taking limits, we can conclude that
∑
h∈H b̃ah = 0 ∀a ∈ A .
 Condition 2.




(̃xsh,n − esh), p̃ sn〉C = 0 (33)




(̃x 0h,n − e0h), p0n〉C ≤ 0 ∀(qn, p0n) ∈ n0; (34)




(̃xsh,n − esh), p sn〉C ≤ 0, ∀psn ∈ ns . (35)
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For any n ∈ N and s ∈ S0, define
C−s := {c ∈ C :
∑
h∈H
(̃xsch,n − esch ) ≤ 0}, C+s := {c ∈ C :
∑
h∈H
(̃xsch,n − esch ) > 0}.




p̃ scn + K if c ∈ C+s ,
p̃ scn − K |C
+
s |
|C−s | if c ∈ C
−
s ,





p̃ scn − 1n
)

















(̃xsch,n −esch ) > 0
contradicting (34) if s = 0 and (35) otherwise. Then we have that C+s = ∅. Hence,
being p̃ >> 0, from Eq. 33, for any s ∈ S0 and c ∈ C, it follows that∑h∈H(̃xsch,n −
esch ) = 0 . Taking limits, we can conclude
∑
h∈H(̃xsch − esch ) = 0, for any s ∈ S0 and
c ∈ C .
5 Conclusions
We presented a proof of the existence of equilibria in a model with restricted par-
ticipation and numeraire asset under relatively general assumptions and by using a
variational inequality approach. By using well chosen specifications of the house-
holds portfolio sets, we can get existence of equilibria in some extensively studied
models of general equilibrium, as an immediate corollary of our result. Indeed,
assume that markets are (potentially) complete in our model, i.e., the rank of the yield
matrix Y is equal to the the number S of states in the second period. Then, our frame-
work coincides with the standard exchange economy, if each households’ portfolio
sets is equal to the entire Euclidean space RA and with the incomplete market case
if restrictions are constant across households and imply that portfolio have to belong
to a linear subspace of dimension equal to the number of available assets A smaller
than the number S of states.
Finally, since any equilibrium with numeraire asset is an equilibrium with nominal
assets (and not vice versa), Villanacci et al. (2002), Proposition 6, page 329, the
existence result we provide implies existence in the model by Siconolfi (1988).
We believe that our approach, which uses the variational inequality theory, has
the following important characteristics. It does provide a general, relatively simple,
few step methodology, which can be applied to show existence of equilibria of any
general equilibrium model (see also Donato et al. (2018a, b)). First of all, some cru-
cial properties of the budget set valued functions have to be proven to hold true on
a well chosen subset of the price set (Proposition 3.7). That analysis provides sim-
ple hints to define a sequence of nonempty, compact, convex sets of prices on which
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those properties are satisfied. Then, the main step is to find an appropriate sequence
of Variational Inequalities problems constructed using those sets (see Theorem 2 and
Proposition 4.3). The associated non-empty solution sets are then used to show the
existence of a sequence whose limit is an equilibrium. The quite interesting charac-
teristic and probably the main virtue of the above described approach is the following
one. The seemingly complicated Variational Inequality (see GQVIn (5)) is made up
by two simple parts. The first one takes care of the individuals maximization prob-
lems in a quite standard manner. The second part is constructed exploiting the very
nature of the model under analysis: the so-called set of Walras’ laws, i.e., the set of
equalities obtained summing up budget equations across households.
Our future research work will focus on the analysis of models with real assets,
restricted participation, possibility of defaults, multiple periods and possibility of
asset trading which are still not completely analyzed in the existing literature. We
also plan to apply the Variational Inequality approach to general equilibrium models
in which households have noncomplete, nontransitive preferences.
Acknowledgments We thank the referees for their careful read which led to improve this manuscript.
Appendix
Definition A.1 Let A be a nonempty convex set in Rn. The recession cone of A is
denoted and defined as follows
recA =
{
y ∈ Rn : ∀x0 ∈ A, ∀λ ≥ 0, x0 + λy ∈ A
}
.
Proposition A.1 (see Soltan (2015)) Let A be a convex set in Rn. Then
1. if A is nonempty, closed and 0n ∈ A,
recA = {z ∈ Rn : ∀λ ≥ 0, λz ∈ A} ⊆ A;
2. recA is a convex cone;
3. if A is closed, then recA is closed;
4. for any a ∈ Rn and μ ∈ R,
rec(a + μA) = μ recA = sgn(μ) recA .
Definition A.2 Let C ⊆ Rn be a nonempty, closed and convex set and let S :
C ⇒ Rn and Φ : C ⇒ Rn be set-valued maps. A Generalized Quasi-Variational
Inequality associated with C, S, Φ, denoted by GQVI, is the following problem:
Find x ∈ S (x) such that there exists ϕ ∈ Φ (x) with 〈ϕ, x − x〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ S (x) .
(36)
In particular, when S(x) = C for any x ∈ C, (36) is a Generalized Variational
Inequality, GVI; when Φ is single-valued, (36) reduces to the Quasi-Variational
Inequality, QVI. When both Φ(x) is singleton and S(x) = C, for any x ∈ C, we have
the classical Stampacchia Variational Inequality, VI.
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Theorem 4 (see Tan (1985)) Let C be a nonempty, convex and compact subset of
R
n. Let Φ : C ⇒ Rn and S : C ⇒ C be two set-valued maps satisfying the following
properties:
(i) S is closed, lower semicontinuous and with nonempty, convex and compact
values;
(ii) Φ is upper semicontinuous with nonempty, convex and compact values.
Then the GQVI (36) admits at least a solution.
The above theorem, which establishes the existence of a solution for variational
inequalities, is a consequence of a Kakutani’s fixed point Theorem.
N>(x) := {h ∈ Rn : 〈h, z − x〉 ≤ 0 ∀ z ∈ P(x)}.




B(0, 1) if P (x) = ∅
conv (N>(x) ∩ S(0, 1)) if P (x) = ∅
(37)
where B(0, 1) = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖ ≤ 1} and S(0, 1) = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖ = 1} are,
respectively, the closed unit ball and the unit sphere of Rn.
Theorem 5 Let P be lower semicontinuous with open and convex valued. Then the
set-valued map G̃, defined in Eq. 37 is with nonempty and convex and compact values,
and upper semicontinuous.
Proof Firstly, we prove that N> is a closed map. Let {xn} ⊆ Rn and {yn} ⊆ Rn be
sequences such that limn→+∞ xn = x and limn→+∞ yn = y with yn ∈ N>(xn). We
have to prove that y ∈ N>(x), that is 〈y, z − xh〉 ≤ 0 ∀z ∈ P(x). We fix z ∈ P(xh)
and since P is lower semicontinuous, there exists {zn} such that zn ∈ P(xn) with
limn→+∞ zn = z. From zn ∈ P(xh,n) and yn ∈ N>(xn), it follows 〈yn, zn−xn〉 ≤ 0.
Passing to the limits 〈y, z − x〉 ≤ 0, so y ∈ N>(x).
All Properties follows from the closedness of N> and the proof of Theorem 3.2 in
Milasi et al. (2019).
Definition A.3 Let C be a convex set of Rn, call (GVI) the following problem:
“ Find x̃ ∈ C such that ∃ g ∈ G (̃x) with 〈g, x − x̃〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ C. ” (38)
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